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I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional rule was that it is impossible to trademark a color
alone.' The only way to trademark a color was as part of a distinctive
design.' Three principal arguments have been advanced for this rule:
color depletion,3 shade confusion,4 and functionality.5 In 1985, how-
ever, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit departed from the
traditional rule and held that a corporation could trademark a color
* Copyright 0 1996 Peter Koebler.
t B.A., University of California; Candidate, M.B.A., Santa Clara University School of
Business, 1996; J.D., Santa Clara University School of Law, 1996.
1. The term "color alone" refers simply to the color of the product itself, applied in an
indiscriminate manner. It has long been the law that a color that is applied in a discriminate
pattern or design can indeed receive trademark protection. See, e.g., Mishawaka Rubber &
Woolen Mfg. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 119 F.2d 316 (6th Cir. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 316 U.S.
203 (1942).
Color, except in connection with some definite arbitrary design which serves to
distinguish the article as made or sold by a particular person, is not the subject of
a trade-mark, but the owner of a valid trade-mark, otherwise distinctive, may be
protected against appropriation by a rival through mere change in color.
119 F.2d at 325.
2. NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 983 (1991).
3. See infra notes 25-47 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
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itself.' While most circuit courts refused to follow the lead of the
Federal Circuit,7 the Eighth Circuit was willing to do so.8 Hence, the
stage was set for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and resolve the
conflict. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.9
and held that it is possible to trademark a color alone. To reach its
decision, the Supreme Court dispensed with the shade confusion argu-
ment and discredited the color depletion theory.' 0 However, the func-
tionality doctrine will continue to act as a potential bar to a color alone
receiving trademark protection."
This case note will begin by providing some background infor-
mation. Each of the three main theories behind the traditional rule
against trademarking a color alone will be explored. The specific
facts of Qualitex will then be discussed and a short analysis of the
Court's decision will be offered. Finally, this note will conclude by
summarizing the analysis and suggesting a method of choosing a color
that is protectable as a trademark.
11. BACKGROUND
Trademark rights were first recognized at common law. 2 Today
in the United States, trademarks are registered by the Patent and
Trademark Office, which maintains a public record of all registered
trademarks. 3 Before granting a trademark, the record is searched to
ensure that no other merchant has already claimed the mark. 4 Note,
however, that the absence of a mark being registered with the Patent
and Trademark Office does not necessarily mean that a mark is freely
available for use, as common law rights to the trademark may none-
theless exist.'" Still, by registering a trademark, a rebuttable presump-
tion of validity is created.' 6
6. In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that the
color pink had no utilitarian purpose and that, upon a showing of secondary meaning in relation
to fiberglass insulation, the color could be registered as a trademark).
7. NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1990); Qualitex Co. v. Jacob-
son Products Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
8. Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 224 (8th Cir. 1993).
9. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
10. Id. at 1305-06.
11. Id at 1304.
12. William J. Keating, Development of Evidence to Support Color-based Trademarks, 9
J.L. & COM. 1, 3 (1989).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1052.
14. Id
15. Keating, supra note 12, at 4.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b).
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The basis for the registration of trademarks with the U.S. Patent
and Trademark office is found in the Lanham Act.' 7 For the purposes
of this case note, the pertinent portion of the Lanham Act is 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127, which provides:
The term "trademark" includes any word, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof -
(1) used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in com-
merce and applies to register on the principal register established
by this chapter, to identify and distinguish his or her goods, includ-
ing a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others
and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is
unknown. 18
Hence, Congress has not explicitly answered the question of whether a
color alone can be trademarked.
In 1906, the Court expressed doubt that color alone could consti-
tute a valid trademark. 9 In Leschen, the plaintiff claimed that it had a
trademark interest in the wire rope that it manufactured because one of
the strands was colored differently than the rest of the rope.2 ° The
plaintiff did not claim to have a trademark in a particular color, but
rather in any colors that could have been woven into wire rope in the
same distinctive manner.2" The Court openly questioned "whether
mere color can constitute a valid trademark."22 However, because the
Court was not actually confronted with the question of whether a par-
ticular color alone could serve as a valid trademark, the Court's specu-
latioh on this point amounted to dicta. Moreover, the Court issued the
decision long before the passage of the Lanham Act. Still, the dicta
was enough to lead lower courts to forbid trademark protection for
color alone.'
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
19. A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166 (1906)
(holding that plaintiff rope company's trademark registration was too broad because it claimed a
"red or other distinctively colored streak" (emphasis added). "Whether mere color can constitute
a valid trade-mark may admit of doubt. Doubtless it may, if it be impressed in a particular
design, as a circle, square, triangle, a cross, or a star. But the authorities do not go farther than
this." Id at 171.
20. Id. at 170.
21. Id.
22. Id
23. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 847 (1949); Life Savers Corp. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 182 F.2d 4, 9 (7th Cir.
1950).
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Three principal arguments have been advanced in support of a
rule prohibiting trademark protection of a color: color depletion, shade
confusion, and functionality.24 A brief explanation of each of these
theories will illuminate the Court's reasoning in Qualitex.
A. The Color Depletion Theory
The color depletion theory assumes there are a limited number of
colors that companies can use on their products. If companies are
allowed to monopolize the use of particular colors, then the list of
available colors will run out. Once the possible colors have been
exhausted by earlier entrants, it will be impossible for later competi-
tors to manufacture a product without infringing on someone's trade-
mark.26 Two cases in particular helped to establish this theory,
Diamond Match Co. v. Saginaw27 and Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour
& Co. 28
In Diamond Match, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
used this theory as the basis for its decision. The plaintiff manufac-
tured a match with a two-colored head: red with a blue tip.29 The
defendant followed the plaintiff's lead and also began manufacturing a
match with a multicolored head, including some with a red and blue
head. 0 The district court granted the plaintiff's suit for an injunction
prohibiting the defendant from selling matches with red and blue
matches." The Sixth Circuit reversed. It reasoned that if Diamond
were allowed to monopolize the colors of red and blue, then others
would soon follow and appropriate other colors for their own prod-
ucts. 2 Competition would be inhibited because there would be no
colors left for new entrants to the match market.33
The Third Circuit reached the same conclusion in Campbell
Soup. 4 Campbell sought to enjoin Armour from using red and white
24. For additional arguments in favor of the functionality rule see Elizabeth A. Overcamp,
Recent Developments: The Qualitex Monster: The Color Trademark Disaster, 2 J. INrTmu. PRop.
L. 595 (1995).
25. See, e.g., Campbell Soup, 175 F.2d at 798.
26. NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 1990); Diamond Match
Co. v. Saginaw Match Co., 142 F. 727, 730 (6th Cir. 1906), cert. denied, 203 U.S. 589 (1906).
27. 142 F. 727.
28. 175 F.2d 795.
29. 142. F. at 728.
30. Id.
31. Id
32. Id. at 729.
33. Id at 730 (citing Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1904)).
34. Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour Co., 175 F.2d 795,798 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 847 (1949).
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labels.35 The district court denied the requested injunction and the
Third Circuit affirmed. 36 The Third Circuit Court felt that if one com-
pany were allowed to monopolize a color, others would soon follow
and deplete the number of available colors.37
This doctrine was finally challenged in Owens-Corning.38 The
plaintiff manufactured pink insulation for residential use.39 After both
a trademark examiner and the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board
(TTAB) denied the application to register the color pink, the plaintiff
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.n" In overrul-
ing the TTAB the Federal Circuit held that each case should be de-
cided on its own facts. 41 The court stated that if, as in Owens-
Coming, the number of remaining colors vastly exceeded the number
of existing competitors, then the color depletion theory should not act
as an automatic bar to trademark registration.42 This case marked the
first time that a color alone received trademark protection.
In Master Distributors v. Pako,43 the Eighth Circuit cited Owens-
Coming with approval.44 The Master Distributors court pointed out
that it would be quite difficult for companies to actually deplete all the
colors in the spectrum because a color can have hundreds, if not
thousands, of distinguishable shades.4' In NutraSweet v. Stadt,46 on
the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit made a
point of rejecting Owens-Coming because, in its view: holding other-
wise would undermine the reliability of lawyers' advice to their clients
on the subject; a trademark of a color in connection with a particular
design affords adequate protection; it will be difficult to distinguish
various shades; and allowing a color to be protected might create a
barrier to competition. 47
B. The Shade Confusion Theory
Proponents of the shade confusion theory argue that litigation
over trademarks will become hopelessly confused if different shades
35. 175 F.2d at 796.
36. Ia at 796, 799.
37. ia at 798.
38. In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
39. IM. at 1118.
40. It
41. Id. at 1120.
42. Id at 1122.
43. 986 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1993).
44. Id at 224.
45. Id at 223.
46. 917 F.2d 1024.
47. Id. at 1027-28.
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of the same color are trademarked.48 Moreover, litigation is the only
way to settle a dispute over whether two colors are confusingly simi-
lar.49 That is to say, there is no color test that will allow potential
litigants to predict whether a court will determine whether a valid
trademark exists. Such confusion would arguably lead to a great deal
of litigation as plaintiffs and defendants alike decided to take their
chances in court. Courts are asked to distinguish between shades of
the same color.50 For trademark rights that arise as a matter of trade-
mark registration, the question of similarity is further confused be-
cause it is not clear whether a court should focus on how a color is
described in its trademark registration or, instead, on how it appears in
the marketplace." There will be a problem if courts rely on the PTO
examination; the process of registering a trademark does not involve
the submission of an actual color sample.52 Instead, colors are repre-
sented on trademark applications by one of eight line patterns, four of
which can represent more than one color. 3 One might query how a
court decide between two shades of the color blue if one shade is
simply represented by a pattern of lines on a trademark application
that was intended by the Patent and Trademark Office to represent all
shades of the color blue. If a court instead compares the products'
appearance in the marketplace, should a court replicate the lighting of
the average store where the products are sold? Should the court com-
pare the two colors from a distance, the way a consumer might view
the products from across a store?
C. The Functionality Theory
The functionality doctrine suggests that manufacturers must not
be allowed to trademark a functional feature of a product because
other manufacturers would not be able to compete effectively. 4 Fur-
ther, granting exclusive rights to a functional feature lies more prop-
48. Id at 1027; Mitek Corp. v. Pyramid Sound Corp., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1389, 1391 (N.D. IIl.
1991).
49. NutraSweet, 917 F.2d at 1027. The "confusingly similar" standard is used to deter-
mine both the existence of trademark infringement and whether a trademark is eligible for fed-
eral registration.
50. Id
51. See generally Amsted Indus., Inc. v. West Coast Wire, Rope & Rigging, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
1755 (Trademark Trial and App. Bd. 1987).
52. 37 C.F.R. § 2.52(e) (1995).
53. Id
54. Diamond Match Co. v. Saginaw Match Co., 142 F. 727, 729-30 (6th Cir. 1906).
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erly within the purview of patent law rather than trademark law.55
The following factors tend to indicate functionality: 1) the existence of
an expired utility patent that disclosed the utilitarian advantage of the
design; 2) the touting of the utilitarian advantages of the design
through advertising; 3) the availability of alternative designs; and 4)
the fact that the design is accomplished by comparatively cheap or
simple manufacturing methods.56 As a general rule, an element of a
product is functional if it is necessary to the practical operation of the
product itself,57 or allows the product to be more affordably pro-
duced.5 8 If a design's aesthetic value lies in its ability to confer a
significant benefit that cannot practically be replicated by the use of
alternative designs, then the design, or in this case color, is func-
tional.5 9 The ultimate test for such aesthetic functionality is whether
the recognition of trademark rights would significantly hinder
60competition.
Intuitively, the use of a particular color will rarely increase the
utility of a product or decrease its cost.61 Nonetheless, there are those
exceptional cases where color is functional. For example, the Seventh
Circuit has held that the multicolored stripes on a Lifesaver candy
package are functional because it allows a consumer to know what is
in the package .6  A district court has held that white knife handles are
functional, as they allow a customer to notice if the handles are
dirty.63 Other courts have focused on the issue of cost. If it would
cost more for competitors to use another color, then the color in ques-
tion creates a competitive advantage and is, therefore, functional.'
Finally, a minority of courts have even found functionality on the
basis of a customer's preference for a particular color. In John Deere
55. Donald M. Hill, Jr., Note, Protection for Trademarks Consisting of Color Alone:
Master Distributors, Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1993), 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 989,
1003 (1995) (citing Vaughn Mfg. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1987)).
56. Hill, supra note 55, at 1003-04 (citing In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332
(C.C.P.A. 1982)).
57. See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339-40 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
58. See, e.g., Schwirm Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1188-89 (7th Cir.
1989).
59. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1306 (quoting REsTATEmENT
(TIRn) OF UNFAIR CoMParrmoN, § 17, cmt. c, at 175-76 (1995)).
60. Id. (quoting Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, § 17, cmt. c, at 176 (1995)).
61. But see Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343-44 (9th Cir. 1952) (referring
to color creating aesthetic functionality).
62. Life Savers Corp. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 182 F.2d 4, 8-9 (7th Cir. 1950).
63. Russell Harrington Cutlery v. Zivi Hercules, Inc., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1965, 1968 (D. Mass.
1992). See also Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 247 F.2d 730, 733 (3rd Cir.
1957) (finding functionality in a blue dot on a photographic light bulb).
64. Schwinn Bicycle, 870 F.2d at 1189. See also Inwood Labs., Inc., v. Ives Labs., 456
U.S. 844, 850-51 n.10 (1982).
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v. Farmhand,65 for example, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a holding that
the color green is functional when applied to certain farm equipment,
as farmers are generally attracted to the color green and would natu-
rally want the color of their new farm equipment to match the color of
the green tractors they already own. 6
IH. PRIOR HISTORY
Since the 1950s, the Qualitex Company (Qualitex) has been in
the business of manufacturing dry cleaning press pads that are a spe-
cial shade of green-gold.67 In 1989, Jacobson Products, a rival of
Qualitex, began selling press pads that were a similar green-gold
color.6" Qualitex sued Jacobson in 1991. Qualitex also applied to
register its green-gold color as a trademark and added a trademark
infringement claim to its unfair competition claim.69 While the suit
was pending, the Patent and Trademark Office granted trademark re-
gistration to Qualitex's green-gold color.70
There is a competitive need in the press pad industry for colored
pads - colored pads hide scorch marks.71 Before Qualitex began us-
ing its green-gold color, however, no other press pad manufacturer
had used this particular color.72 Since 1970, Qualitex used the color
in its advertisements. 73 Further, Qualitex distributed materials at trade
shows that pictured its press pads and draped its booths in the same
green-gold color.7 4
The District Court for the Central District of California held that
Jacobson was guilty of both trademark infringement and unfair com-
petition.75 Jacobson was, therefore, ordered to pay over $8,000 plus
costs, as well as being permanently enjoined from using the same or
65. 560 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 1982), aff'd per curiam, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983).
66. 560 F. Supp. at 98.
67. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1302 (1995). Press pads act as
padding on machines that press clothes in the dry cleaning and garment manufacturing industry.
The pad is made from a combination of fiberglass, rubber and insulating materials, and is
designed to resist heat. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1457 (C.D. Cal.
1991).
68. 115 S. Ct. at 1302.
69. Md at 1301.
70. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115
S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
71. Overcamp, supra note 24, at 596 (citing Appellee's Brief in Opposition to Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, at 11, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 13 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 93-
1577).
72. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1457, 1458 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
73. IA
74. Id
75. Id at 1462.
[Vol. 12
QUALITEX TRADEMARKING COLOR
similar green-gold color.16 Jacobson then appealed, seeking a declara-
tion pursuant to its original counterclaim that color alone could not be
trademarked.77 In a unanimous decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed
the district court's finding and held that color alone cannot be trade-
marked.7" However, because the court affirmed the unfair competi-
tion claim, the award of damages and the injunction against Jacobson
were allowed to stand.79
The Ninth Circuit's decision added to the conflict among the cir-
cuits regarding this issue. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the conflicts among the circuits."0
IV. ANALYSIS ON APPEAL
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, began with a discussion of
the Lanham Act." Under its provisions, a mark must act as a symbol,
have secondary meaning and perform no nontrademark function. 2
The Court reasoned that since a shape, a sound, and even a scent could
meet the above criteria, so could a color.8 3 The Court held that: "Both
the language of the Act and the basic underlying principles of trade-
mark law would seem to include color within the universe of things
that can qualify as a trademark." The Court also found that color
satisfied the "more important" portion of the statutory definition of a
trademark, which requires a one's use of the mark to distinguish one's
goods from other competitors.8" This portion of the test addresses
whether of not a feature of a product has acquired secondary meaning.
Secondary meaning exists if, in the minds of the public, the primary
significance of a feature is to identify the source of the product instead
of the product itself.8 6 Hence, where color alone has attained secon-
76. 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1462.
77. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1994). rev'd, 115 S.
Ct. 1300 (1995).
78. 13 F.3d at 1305.
79. Id.
80. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
81. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127.
82. 115 S. Ct. at 1302-04.
83. Id. at 1303.
84. Id at 1302.
85. Id at 1303. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
86. Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.1 1 (1982). Note, however,
that not all marks require secondary meaning to be valid trademarks. Trademark law recognizes
four different categories of terms, in descending order or strength: arbitrary or fanciful, sugges-
tive, descriptive, and generic. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9
(2d Cir. 1976). Fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks do not require secondary meaning
because their use does not limit how other manufacturers will mark their products. Id. at 11.
Moreover, since such marks have no natural connection to the product, they receive the broadest
19961
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dary meaning, thereby identifying a product with a particular brand, it
can be trademarked.87
The Court also agreed with the minority of courts who have sug-
gested that customers' preference for a particular color could make
that color functional and bar trademark protection. 88 The Court ex-
plained that if a color acts to make a product desirable, it cannot re-
ceive trademark protection because the color would then be "essential
to the use or purpose" of the product.8" Not even Jacobson, however,
had the audacity to suggest that customers found Qualitex's green-
gold color attractive.90 So, while the functionality doctrine may con-
tinue to be used as a potential bar to color alone receiving a trademark,
it did not apply it the facts of Qualitex.
Jacobson gave four reasons why the Court should prohibit the
protection of color alone.91 The Court found all of them unpersua-
sive.92 Jacobson began by arguing in favor of the shade confusion
theory.93 Writing for the court, Justice Breyer quickly dispensed with
this argument. He explained that however confusing it might be to
engage in shade analysis, it would be no more confusing than deciding
the difficult questions surrounding whether two words, phrases, or
symbols are sufficiently similar to warrant trademark protection. 4
The Court even suggested that lower courts should consider repli-
cating the relevant lighting conditions, stating, "We do not see why
courts could not apply those standards to a color, replicating, if neces-
sary, lighting conditions under which a colored product is normally
sold."95 The standards to which the Court refers are those legal stan-
dards that have traditionally been used to guide courts in comparing
words, phrases, and symbols to determine if they are confusingly simi-
lar, e.g., strong marks with secondary meaning, receive greater protec-
tion than weak marks. 96 Where marks are merely suggestive or
possible trademark protection. Id. Generic marks, on the other hand, are marks that the public
associates with a particular type of product rather than a particular supplier of the product. Id. at
9. These marks cannot be trademarked because doing so would deprive a competitor from call-
ing a product by its name. IM. This seems to imply that color is a descriptive mark, which
requires a showing of secondary meaning in order to be a valid trademark.
87. 115 S. Ct. at 1304.
88. Id at 1306.
89. Id (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc., v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)).
90. The district court specifically held that the green-gold color gives Qualitex no competi-
tive advantage in the press pad market. Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1459.
91. 115 S. Ct. at 1305-08.
92. Id
93. Id at 1305.
94. I1.
95. Id
96. Id at 1305-07.
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descriptive, they are weak marks that are afforded protection only in
the narrow field in which they have been used.9 7
Second, Jacobson tried advancing the color depletion theory in
support of the traditional rule.98 The Court responded that this theory
attempts to use an exceptional problem to justify a blanket prohibition
and is unreasonable.99 In addition, the Court went on to suggest that
in those few cases where the full spectrum of colors might be depleted
by granting a trademark to color alone, the functionality doctrine
could be applied to protect competitors from being disadvantaged. 00
Therefore, while the color depletion theory has been substantially dis-
credited, it may still apply by way of the functionality doctrine.
Jacobson's third argument, based on stare decisis, was essentially
that the Court should not allow a color to be trademarked.' Jacob-
son cited many cases, including some Supreme Court opinions, dem-
onstrating that the majority of the courts that had considered the issue
had refused to allow trademark protection to be extended to color
alone.' 02 The Court distinguished the cited Supreme Court cases be-
cause they were decided before the passage of the Lanham Act in
1946.103 Moreover, the Court noted that the Federal Circuit, at least,
had concluded that trademark protection of color alone was consistent
with the Lanham Act."° The Court also highlighted the fact that it
was the Patent and Trademark Office's explicit policy to allow colors
as trademarks.'0 5 Further, the Court stated that when Congress
amended the Lanham Act in 1988, it must have intended to allow a
color alone to be trademarked, given the following additional factors:
1) the Federal Circuit had already held in Owens-Coming that it was
possible to trademark a color alone, and Congress did not take the
opportunity to provide otherwise by statute; 2) the Trademark Associ-
ation's Trademark Review Commission had written a report recom-
mending that trademark law not be narrowed to preclude the
97. Majestic Mfg. Co. v. Majestic Elec. Appliance Co., 172 F.2d 862, 863 (6th Cir. 1949).
98. 115 S. Ct. at 1305.
99. Il at 1306.
100. Id A similar logic has been expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Int'l Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 823 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining the
reasoning behind the court's decision in First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378
(9th Cir. 1987)).
101. 115 S. Ct. at 1307-08.
102. Id at 1307.
103. Id.
104. 1& at 1308-09.
105. The Court's opinion noted that the Patent and Trademark Office recognizes color alone
as trademarkable and brings this fact to the attention of examiners in its manual of procedures.
Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1304. See U.S. Dept of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office, Trade-
mark Manual of Examining Procedure § 1202.04(e) (2d ed. 1993).
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registration of such things as color; and 3) the Congressional Record
indicated'that Lanham Act amendments were based upon the Trade-
mark Review Commission's report. 10 6 Hence, the Court's decision to
allow a color alone to be trademarked gave effect to Congressional
intent.
Fourth, Jacobson argued that a company's use of color can be
adequately protected without granting a trademark on the color. 10 7 A
plaintiff could bring an unfair competition claim or, so long as color is
used as part of a greater design, the Lanham Act would clearly protect
a company's exclusive use of that color.108 The Court, however, rec-
ognized there might be products on which it is difficult to put designs,
e.g., an industrial bolt that is usually seen from a distance.'0 9 In such
a case, a firm may simply desire to use a color alone to distinguish its
products from the competition. " The Court concluded that only by
allowing protection of a color alone would the bolt manufacturer's
exclusive use of a particular color be adequately protected."1
V. CONCLUSION
It is now possible to trademark color alone." 2 However, the
functionality doctrine can still act as a bar." 3 The color depletion
argument might also act as a bar if it can be used to convince a court
to invoke the functionality rule, i.e., granting a trademark to a color
alone would, because of color depletion, gives a firm a competitive
advantage and is therefore a function of the product itself.'14 The
shade confusion theory, on the other hand, has been put to rest. ' 15
Customer preference for a particular color can be enough to war-
rant the application of the functionality doctrine." 16 The functionality
doctrine can also be applied if using a particular color represents a
cost advantage.' ' 7 A corporation wishing to trademark a color alone
106. 115 S. Ct. at 1307-08.
107. Id at 1308 (referring to "trade dress" protection under the Lanham Act).
108. Id
109. Id
110. Id
111. Id The Court explained that trademark protection helps the holder of the mark in
many ways that "trade dress" does not. Id
112. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
113. Id at 1306.
114. Id
115. Id at 1305.
116. Id at 1306.
117. Inwood Labs., Inc., v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982). In Qualitex the
district court found that Qualitex's green-gold color was more expensive than other colors.
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1457, 1459 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
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will, therefore, want to consider selecting a color that is both unattrac-
tive, or at least is not a preferred color among one's customers, and is
at least as expensive as other alternative colors.
As a practical matter, opponents of color trademarks will begin
by arguing that the color chosen is not inherently distinctive. This will
place a heavy burden on the proponent of the trademark to prove it has
acquired secondary meaning.' 18 Next, the opponent of the color trade-
mark will argue that the use of the particular color concerned amounts
to a competitive advantage either because it is aesthetically functional
or because its incorporation represents a cost savings.
Proponents of the color trademark, on the other hand, will argue
that their color has acquired secondary meaning. Further, the color in
question gives the proponent no competitive advantage. Because
strong marks will receive broader protection, the more outlandish -
and perhaps unattractive - colors are likely to qualify for protection.
118. In the case of Qualitex, this happened not to be a difficult task; some purchasers identi-
fied the press pads over the telephone merely by describing its color. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
Prods., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1457, 1459. In addition, purchasers were more likely to notice the color
of Qualitex's pads, as they were known to be the best in the business. Il at 1458.
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